A previous paper described an experiment showing that Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash collisions of files have no impact on integrity verification in the forensic imaging process. This paper describes a similar experiment applied when two files have a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) collision.
INTRODUCTION
An earlier paper (Kessler, 2017) discussed the impact on the hash value of two disk images that contain the same set of files except for one --one file that has the same Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash value as another file of the same size but different content. That paper showed that the resulting disk image hash values were, in fact, different even though all of the component files and spaces on the disk had the same hash.
That paper was specific to MD5 hash collisions. As it was coming to press, Stevens, Bursztein, Karpman, Albertini, and Markov (2017) announced a SHA-1 hash collision between two files of the same size with different content. This paper will use the same methodology as the earlier paper to address the impact of SHA-1 hash collisions on validating the results of the computer forensics imaging process. Section 2 will state the research question. Section 3 will describe the experimental framework with which to test the research hypothesis, followed by test results in Section 4. Section 5 will offer conclusions.
RESEARCH QUESTION
The earlier paper (Kessler, 2017) described a scenario that can be summarized as follows: Suppose we have two files, A and B, that have different content but are the same size and have the same SHA-1 hash value. What is the effect on the hash value of two disk images that differ only in that one disk contains File A and the other disk contains File B (where Files A and B occupy the same location on the two disk images)? SHA-1 is described in Eastlake and Jones (2001) and NIST (2015) .
The research question is to test the following null hypothesis (H 0 ) as follows:
• The resultant two disk images will have the same hash value.
The a follows:
• 
TESTS AND RESULTS
Four tests were conducted on the media described above. The results described in this section are summarized in Table 1 .
In Test #S1, the thumb drive was imaged using FTK Imager (v3.1.3.2). The purpose of this test was merely to prepare a baseline disk image and set of hash values. The image verification SHA-1 hash of the thumb drive was 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b 9b18 and the complete FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 2. The image was examined with FTK (v1.81.6) and the file listing for hash1.pdf showed the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the shattered-1.pdf file (as shown in Section 3).
For Test #S2, the thumb drive was mounted with WinHex and the contents of hash1.bin were copied over the 128-byte "collision block" of hash1.pdf on the thumb drive (i.e., the 128 bytes starting at offset 0x8490C0 on the image). The purpose of this test was to confirm that overwriting data in this way was possible and reliable. Note that it was not necessary to change anything else on the thumb drive since the two files were the same size; no changes were necessary to the FAT table entries or to the directory name, address, or file size. The thumb drive was then re-imaged. The image verification SHA-1 hash was 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b 9b18 --the same as in Test #S1. This result confirms that overwriting data in this way is an adequate process and changes nothing else on the drive. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 3. The FTK file listing showed that hash1.pdf had the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the shattered-1.pdf file.
For Test #S3, the thumb drive was mounted in WinHex and the contents of hash2.bin were copied over the 128-byte "collision block" where hash1.pdf resided on the thumb drive, thus creating the shattered-2.pdf file. This test was really the crux of the hypothesis experiment since hash1.pdf now contained the "hash-equivalent, contentdifferent" file. The thumb drive was re-imaged, yielding an image verification SHA-1 hash of a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603ead be6 --different than Tests #S1 and #S2. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 4. The FTK file listing showed © 2016 ADFSL that hash1.pdf had the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the shattered-2.pdf file.
For Test #S4, the thumb drive was mounted with WinHex and the contents of hash1.bin were copied back over the "collision block" where hash1.pdf resided on the thumb drive, now recreating the shattered-1.pdf file. The purpose of this test was to restore the drive to its original state and confirm that Test #S3 changed nothing more than the 128 bytes where the test data resided. The image verification SHA-1 hash was 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b 9b18 --the same as in Tests #S1 and #S2. This result confirms that Test #S4 had restored the disk to its initial state and that Test #S3 changed nothing more than the file data. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 5. The FTK file listing showed that hash1.pdf had the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the shattered-1.pdf file.
CONCLUSIONS
The image verification SHA-1 hashes in Tests #S1, #S2, and #S4 --images that each held the shattered-1.pdf (hash1.bin) content --had the same value, whereas the image verification SHA-1 hash value in Test #S3 --when the image held the shattered-2.pdf (hash2.bin) content --was different from the other tests. The fact that Tests #S1, #S2, and #S4 had the same hash proved that the test process worked as desired; the fact that Test #S3 had a different result shows that the hash value of the imaged drive depends upon the actual bit content of the entire drive. Since the hash values of the two images are not the same, the null hypothesis (H 0 ) is disproven and the alternate hypothesis (H 1 ) is proven. 
Description of Test
Image SHA-1 Hash Value #S1 -Drive with shattered-1.pdf 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 #S2 -Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with hash1.bin data (shattered-1.pdf) 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 #S3 -Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with hash2.bin data (shattered-2.pdf) a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603eadbe6 #S4 -Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with hash1.bin data (shattered-1.pdf) 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 As in the prior paper, disproving the null hypothesis is the expected result because the hash value of a disk image is based upon the bit contents of the disk rather than the hashes of the individual files --including file system structures and unallocated space --that compose the disk contents. Thus, even if all of the file hashes on two disks are the same, the disk image hashes will be different if the contents of the files are different. Given this result, the scenario described in Section 2 cannot be realized.
It is hoped that this result will lay the concern about file hash collisions to rest as they apply to digital forensic imaging. As long as both individual files and the entire image are hashed, the theoretical occurrence of individual file collisions is not a factor in confirming the evidentiary integrity of a forensic copy.
This said, the fact that SHA-1 collision can be forced is significant. Although the SHA-1 standard was deprecated in 2013, it is still in wide use.
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Page 143 As noted in the prior paper, the MD5 hash values are different for the shattered-1.pdf and shattered-2.pdf files, although the SHA-1 hash value is the same. Since the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are different, the manipulation that can create an MD5 collision cannot create a SHA-1 collision --indeed, note the complexity of the SHA-1 collision compared to the relative simplicity of the mD5 collision. To date, no one has yet shown a practical method with which to cause both an MD5 and SHA-1 collision in the same file. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a pattern emerges when looking at the bytes bit-by-bit. The following table shows the values of the 128-byte "difference" block when the two files are ExclusivelyORed (XOR) together; a 0 indicates bits that are the same in the two blocks and a 1 indicates bits that are flipped:
NOTE
00C0: 00001100 00000000 00000000 00000010 00D0: 10111100 00000000 00000000 00011010 00E0: 00001100 00000000 00000000 00000010 00F0: 10111100 00000000 00000000 00011000 00C4: 11000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00D4: 00100000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00E4: 11000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00F4: 10110000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00C8: 10110100 00000000 00000000 00011100 00D8: 00100100 00000000 00000000 00011100 00E8: 10110100 00000000 00000000 00011100 00F8: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00001100 00CC: 00111100 00000000 00000000 00000100 00DC: 11101100 00000000 00000000 00010100 00EC: 00101100 00000000 00000000 00000100 00FC: 10111000 00000000 00000000 00010000
The table above only shows the portion of the block from offset 0x00C0-00FF; the block from offset 0x0100-0x013F exhibits the same pattern.
In summary, 62 bytes of the 128-byte block (48.4%) are different, including 92 of the 256 nibbles (35.9%) and 150 of the 1,024 bits (14.6%).
